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NOTES
The Waiting Game: How States Can
Solve the Organ-Donation Crisis
Thousands of patients in the United States live in limbo every
day waiting for a lifesaving organ transplant, and the gap between the
number of people who need a transplant and the number of available
organs widens every year. Every state currently allows individuals to
unilaterally indicate their intent to donate their organs upon death, but
in practice, family members are frequently allowed to override the
express intentions of decedents. In addition, the current U.S. “opt-in”
system fails to reach its full potential because many eligible decedents
never express their desires to become or not to become organ donors, and
family members refuse to consent to donation or cannot be contacted in
time. This Note argues that states should again take the lead in organdonation regulation to solve the organ-shortage crisis and proposes a
twofold solution for states to adopt. First, states should switch to a
presumed-consent, or opt-out, model. Second, states should implement a
monitoring and enforcement mechanism through which state attorneys
general and state health departments enforce first-person authorization.
Organ procurement organizations should be required to adopt bylaws
requiring their strict compliance with decedents’ wishes, and a failure to
do so would give state attorneys general grounds to sue for breach of
501(c)(3) status obligations. The result would be to increase the supply
of viable organs for transplant by interpreting an individual’s failure to
opt out as a desire to donate and to enforce this choice by not allowing
anyone to override it.
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INTRODUCTION
“We prayed for a miracle that Curtis would be okay, but when
we knew that wasn’t going to happen, we prayed that he could be a
miracle for someone else.”1 Twenty-nine years ago, Curtis Gano, a
sixteen-year-old boy, was riding his bike when a van struck him, leaving
him brain dead.2 His parents did not want his memory to end there, so
they donated his organs and saved four other lives.3 The family had
watched a documentary on organ and tissue donation years earlier and
knew the impact it would have on other families.4
The stories of organ donees, such as Curtis’s beneficiaries, may
begin long before they get sick, before they are put on the transplant
1.
Donor Dad Reaches 200,000 Students with His Story, GIFT LIFE DONOR PROGRAM (June
6,
2018),
https://www.donors1.org/cherry-hill-nj-resident-reaches-200000-students-with-lifesaving-message-2 [https://perma.cc/9L7R-TSLQ].
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
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list, and maybe even before they are born. Their stories begin when a
teenager checks “yes” to organ donation at the DMV, when an older man
registers to be an organ donor after meeting the donee of an organ
transplant, or when a family like the Ganos is struck by tragedy and
consents to having its child’s organs donated. The stories of the 28,587
people5 saved by deceased donors in 2017 started when someone was
placed in a similar situation.
Every day in the United States, twenty people on the organtransplant list have their stories cut short while waiting for an
available organ.6 This tragedy is not due to the lack of a cure or even a
lack of resources. Although transplant technology has drastically
improved over the last twenty years, the number of transplants
performed each year has not increased. The organ-donation process in
the United States is at a standstill: with deceased-donor transplant
operations hovering between twenty-eight and twenty-nine thousand
annually in recent years,7 approximately 114,000 people remain
waiting for an organ in 2019.8 Current legislation and policies fail to
address this public health crisis, which only continues to balloon.9
States led the drive to regulate and promote organ donation at its
inception10 but have since retreated and now fail to effectively monitor
and enforce their organ-donation laws.
This Note analyzes the shortcomings of the legal framework for
organ donation in the United States and demonstrates that the lack of
state regulation and enforcement is at the heart of the problem. Part I
provides background information and a brief history of the U.S. organdonation process. Part II discusses why organ donation has not reached
its full potential in the United States and the failures of the present
legal framework. Part III proposes a twofold solution: switching to a
presumed-consent model and creating a monitoring and enforcement
mechanism for states. The Conclusion reiterates the importance of
5.
Deceased Organ Donors in United States Exceeded 10,000 for First Time in 2017, UNOS
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://unos.org/deceased-organ-donors-in-united-states-exceeded-10000-for-firsttime-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/9PKW-KRCE] [hereinafter Donors Exceeded 10,000].
6.
Transplant Trends, UNOS, https://unos.org/data/transplant-trends/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2019) [https://perma.cc/4EM7-WRJB].
7.
Sally Satel & David C. Cronin II, Time to Test Incentives to Increase Organ Donation, 175
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1329, 1329 (2015).
8.
Transplant Trends, supra note 6.
9.
From 1988 to 2011, the supply of transplantable organs grew by 140 percent, while the
number of individuals waiting for a transplant grew by 650 percent. Adelin Levin, The Impact of
First-Person Consent Legislation on the Supply of Deceased Organ Donors 2 (Apr. 26, 2014)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Grand Valley State University), https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1302&context=honorsprojects [https://perma.cc/NF8A-6HLG].
10. States started enacting their own organ-donation regulations in the 1960s, whereas the
federal government did not enact any legislation on the issue until 1984. See infra Section I.B.
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states in reclaiming their authority to regulate and enforce organdonation processes within their jurisdictions.
I. THE NETWORK OF ORGAN-DONATION REGULATION
In 1954, Dr. Joseph Murray, a Boston surgeon, performed the
first successful kidney transplant.11 Surgeons had been researching and
experimenting with organ and tissue transplantation since the
eighteenth century, but Dr. Murray’s operation—transferring a kidney
from a living donor to his identical twin brother—was the first to extend
a donee’s life for a substantial period.12 In 1962, Dr. Murray performed
the first successful deceased-donor kidney transplant, and before the
decade’s end, various other surgeons had performed the first successful
liver, lung, pancreas, and heart transplants, prompting the emergence
of transplant centers across the United States and Europe.13
This Part begins by detailing the logistics of today’s lifesaving
organ-donation process. It then proceeds to detail the current U.S.
regulatory framework for the organ-transplantation process—
discussing state law and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts in Section
I.B and the applicable federal regulations in Section I.C.
A. The Donation Process
A patient in need of an organ transplant is trapped in a waiting
game until she receives the phone call that a donor has matched. An
organ procurement organization (“OPO”), the cornerstone of the organdonation process,14 is responsible for delivering the good news. OPOs
are regional, private nonprofit organizations incorporated under state
law that work with organ-transplant facilities and qualifying hospitals
to arrange for the acquisition and preservation of donated organs and
allocate them to patients on the waiting list.15 OPOs started developing
in the 1960s and were initially intended to each serve the transplant
program at just one hospital, but they gradually expanded to serve
multiple transplant programs in a given geographical region.16 The
11. Richard J. Howard et al., History of Deceased Organ Donation, Transplantation, and
Organ Procurement Organizations, 22 PROGRESS TRANSPLANTATION 6, 7 (2012).
12. Id. The donee survived another eight years, and the donor another fifty-six years.
Dr. Murray was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1990 for his work in transplantation. Id.
13. Id.
14. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 13 (2002).
15. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 10, 14.
16. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 140 n.20; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 10,
14.
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United States now has fifty-eight OPOs, which serve 248 transplant
centers across the country. Each OPO covers a specific geographic
region assigned by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) and is responsible for coordinating donations and allocations
within that region and occasionally across the country.17
From their inception, OPOs served as the connection between
transplant centers and donor hospitals.18 The Division of Organ
Transplantation, an administrative unit under HHS, tasks OPOs to
work closely with organ-transplant facilities in their respective regions
to identify potential donors, conduct systematic efforts to acquire all
usable organs, ensure compliance with standards adopted by the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (“OPTN”), and increase
public outreach through community awareness.19 Hospitals enter into
contracts with their designated OPO to coordinate the procurement and
use of organs as anatomical gifts.20
The OPO assigned to the donor’s hospital becomes involved
when the donor is declared medically and legally brain dead.21 Under
federal regulations, every hospital must notify its local OPO of patients
who have died or are nearing death so the OPO can start planning for
a potential organ transplantation.22 Despite this initial notice, a patient
will not be evaluated for organ donation until doctors have taken all
lifesaving measures.23 Once a hospital notifies an OPO of a potential
donor’s death, it must make “a reasonable search of the records of the
Department of Public Safety and any donor registry that it knows exists
17. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14. The number of OPOs has fluctuated, with over 128
in 1986, many of which were in the same city and competed for hospital contracts and potential
donors. Id. OPOs have since consolidated and been assigned exclusive geographic collections
regions. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13. Many smaller OPOs were not economically
viable and recovered too few organs, so they eventually merged with larger OPOs to improve
effectiveness. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14. To remain solvent, OPOs often competed for
hospital contracts with one another. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13. Because each
OPO is now exclusively entitled to a specific geographic region, competition no longer exists among
OPOs for organs or to outperform each other.
18. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14.
19. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14.
20. Gerry W. Beyer, Controlling Body Disposition: The Law and the Macabre 7 (Oct. 31, 2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862112
[https://perma.cc/NTR6-BLAU].
21. See infra Section I.A. Donors are those patients who are brain dead but still have healthy,
functioning organs suitable for transplantation.
22. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(1) (2018); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Deceased
Donation
Process,
ORGANDONOR.GOV,
https://organdonor.gov/about/process/deceaseddonation.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/WJ4W-BV32] [hereinafter The
Deceased Donation Process].
23. Donation Process, CTR. FOR ORGAN RECOVERY & EDUC., https://www.core.org/
understanding-donation/donation-process/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XM8TJ2ZR].
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for the geographical area in which the individual resides”24 and must
reasonably “search for any person . . . having priority to make an
anatomical gift on behalf of a prospective donor.”25 If the decedent has
already indicated her intent to donate, such as on a driver’s license, the
OPO does not have to seek consent from a person with priority.26
If the decedent is a registered donor, the registration serves as
legal authorization for a transplantation team to procure the organs for
donation (“first-person authorization”).27 If the decedent is not
registered, the OPO will ask the decedent’s next of kin for authorization
to remove and use the organs for donation.28
Once authorization is received, hospital personnel enter the
donor’s medical characteristics into the United Network for Organ
Sharing (“UNOS”), a national database of all patients awaiting a
transplant, which then matches each organ with the best potential
donee.29 The OPTN, a nonprofit organization under contract with the
federal government, administers UNOS.30 Recipients of the organs are
usually located proximate to the donor, but UNOS can also share them
with waiting patients in other regions.31 While the matching process is
underway, the donor’s organs are kept on artificial support and closely
monitored.32 A transplant-surgical team supplants the medical team
that was treating the patient before death,33 as medical personnel
trying to save the patient’s life can never be involved with the

24. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692A.014(a) (West 2017).
25. Id. § 692A.014(g). This Texas law is one example of a state statute adopting the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”). Other states have similar provisions.
26. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 cmt. (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
2009). A person with priority is authorized to make an anatomical gift of a decedent’s organs, and
the order of priority for whose permission is sought is outlined in section 9 of the latest version of
the UAGA (“2006 Revised Act”). Id. Many OPOs, however, still will seek consent from a person
with priority, even when the decedent has made her intentions clear, and will follow the wishes of
the family member instead of the express wishes of the patient. See infra Section II.C.
27. Organ Donation Process, LIFEGIFT, http://www.lifegift.org/organ-donation-process (last
visited Jan. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9ZGP-VRFL]; The Deceased Donation Process, supra note
22.
28. The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22.
29. Id.
30. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Glossary of Organ Donation Terms,
ORGANDONOR.GOV, https://www.organdonor.gov/about/facts-terms/terms.html (last visited Jan.
12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/S44R-6QN7].
31. The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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transplant process.34 The donor’s organs are removed in an operating
room and taken to the donee by air or ambulance.35
B. State Law and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts
The development of organ-transplant technology provoked
legislation to regulate these groundbreaking procedures. State law
governs most of the substantive standards, rights, and obligations of
hospitals and OPOs, including donor registration, public education,
declaration of brain death, and authorization to donate.36 States took
action to regulate and control the organ-donation process in the 1960s,37
long before the federal government enacted its first legislation on the
matter in 1984. In 1968, the Uniform Legal Commission (“ULC”)38
issued the first Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”) to promote
uniformity among states and simplify the organ-transplantation
process in order to increase the number of cadaveric donors.39 States
could and did adopt the UAGA as their own legislation.40 Organ
transplantation is time sensitive and involves coordination among
states, especially when donors and donees are located in different
states.41 Thus, having uniform laws across cooperating states is
imperative to procuring and allocating organs efficiently as they become
available.42

34. Donation Process, supra note 23; The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22. Medical
personnel responsible for attempting to save the patient’s life must be separate from the transplant
team to avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest.
35. The Deceased Donation Process, supra note 22.
36. Sam Crowe & Eric Cohen, Organ Transplantation Policies and Policy Reforms,
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2006), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps92649/
organ_donation.html [https://perma.cc/Z87Q-NRNQ]. Federal law prescribes standards for OPO
certification, outcome requirements, and process performance measures. See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 486.303–.360 (2018).
37. See COMM. ON ISSUES IN ORGAN DONOR INTERVENTION RESEARCH, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS.,
ENG’G & MED., OPPORTUNITIES FOR ORGAN DONOR INTERVENTION RESEARCH 73 (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470922/ [https://perma.cc/8U8T-UC9V] (explaining that
“states began enacting organ donation and procurement legislation in the 1960s when organ
transplantation became a viable medical procedure”).
38. The ULC, also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, reviews and studies state laws, determines which areas of law should be uniform among the
fifty states and District of Columbia, and proposes model legislation for state legislatures to adopt.
Overview, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last visited
Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AF58-RBYM].
39. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 11.
40. Id.
41. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4).
42. Id.
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The UAGA was amended in 1987 specifically to prioritize, for the
first time, a donor’s wishes above those of her family,43 but it did not
strictly prohibit seeking familial consent before procuring organs, as
was the general practice.44 Only twenty-six states, however, adopted
the 1987 UAGA.45 While some attributed the lack of widespread
acceptance to the small number of significant changes, others blamed
the provision permitting coroners and medical examiners to make
anatomical gifts if no family could be found and a contrary intention
was not known (“presumed consent”).46 The UAGA was again amended
in 2006 (“2006 Revised Act”) and subsequently adopted by forty-six
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.47 It
currently serves as the model act for state regulation of the organdonation process in hospitals nationwide.48 The 2006 Revised Act
reaffirmed the importance of first-person authorization and maintained
a good faith affirmative defense for transplantation professionals, both
discussed below in more detail.
Emerging state laws on the topic ignited debate over when a
potential donor should be pronounced medically and legally dead and
when it becomes ethically acceptable to procure that person’s organs for
transplantation.49 In 1981, the ULC adopted the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (“UDDA”), which defines death as the
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or the

43. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009); id. § 2(h) (“An
anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require
the consent or concurrence of any person after the donor’s death.”).
44. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4).
45. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note.
46. Daphne D. Sipes, Legislative Update on the State Adoption of the 1987 Revision to the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 395, 426–28, 435 (1990). This provision
was modeled after states’ presumed-consent statutes for corneas, eye tissue, and occasionally
organs. See infra Section I.B.3.
47. Anatomical Gift Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=015e18ad-4806-4dff-b011-8e1ebc0d1d0f (last visited Jan. 13,
2019) [https://perma.cc/F3SE-FJBP].
48. Id.
49. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 9. For example, states typically chose one of four common
models to follow when they enacted brain-death laws in the 1970s: the Kansas model, providing
alternative means for determining death; the Capron-Kass model, where death is pronounced
while heart and lung functions are artificially maintained; the American Bar Association model,
where irreversible cessation of total brain function equals death; or the Uniform Brain Death
model, which is similar to American Bar Association model but emphasizes irreversible cessation
of brain stem function. Frank P. Stuart et al., Brain Death Laws and Patterns of Consent to Remove
Organs for Transplantation from Cadavers in the United States and 28 Other Countries, 31
TRANSPLANTATION 238, 242 (1981).
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cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.50
All fifty states and the District of Columbia adopted the UDDA, but
guidelines on how to determine brain death as defined in the UDDA
currently vary among states and between hospitals.51
1. First-Person Authorization
The 2006 Revised Act significantly relaxed the process for
becoming an organ donor; individuals are now empowered to consent
either by signing a donor card or other official document—such as a
driver’s license application—or by enrolling in a donor registry.52 Each
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia currently operates its
own online donor-consent registry that allows hospitals and OPOs to
check donor status.53 Additionally, fifty-seven of fifty-eight OPOs
operate online registries that enable individuals to register online as
organ donors.54
The 2006 Revised Act stresses the importance of donor
autonomy, dedicating an entire section to the preclusive effects of
registering as an organ donor.55 It requires hospitals and OPOs to honor
a decedent’s express wishes and to ignore family members’ attempts to
override the donor’s decision.56 Under section 8(a), “[I]n the absence of
50. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980); Howard et al., supra
note 11, at 9.
51. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 9. For example:
In some states, 1 physician is required to pronounce brain death, whereas in other
states 2 physicians are needed. Furthermore, in some states 2 declarations of brain
death have to be separated in time, but in others both declarations can be made at the
same time. Some states specify which physicians can diagnose brain death; others do
not. Thus, currently an individual can be pronounced dead in 1 state but be considered
alive in the state next door. . . . [G]uidelines for determination of brain death vary
considerably among US hospitals.
Id. at 9–10. In Texas, a registered nurse or physician’s assistant can declare a patient brain dead
if allowed by the hospital’s written policy, unless the patient is on life support. What Is the Uniform
Declaration of Death Act (UDDA)?, FINDLAW, https://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/whatis-the-uniform-declaration-of-death-act-or-udda.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
X4XY-YC8U].
52. W.J. Chon et al., When the Living and the Deceased Cannot Agree on Organ Donation: A
Survey of US Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs), 14 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 172, 173
(2014).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 172.
55. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8 (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009).
56. The 1987 Act stated in a one-sentence provision that “[a]n anatomical gift that is not
revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent . . . of any person
after the donor’s death.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended
by REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT. The drafters of the 2006 Revised Act purposefully
expanded the provision to draw attention to it and reinforce its intent. Beyer, supra note 20
(manuscript at 6).
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an express, contrary indication by the donor, a person other than the
donor is barred from making, amending, or revoking an anatomical gift
of a donor’s body or part if the donor made an anatomical gift of the
donor’s body or part.”57 This addition, known as first-person
authorization or first-person consent, forbids families from overriding a
decedent’s explicit donation of her organs; doctors and hospital
personnel are thus required to follow the decedent’s directive, not the
wishes of the family.58
First-person authorization was not a groundbreaking concept
when it was included as part of the 2006 Revised Act. States began
enacting first-person-authorization laws in 199459 “based on the
principle that a decision by a person with decision-making capacity
should be respected even after he or she dies.”60 These laws are widely
supported by empirical evidence that concludes that knowledge of a
patient’s wishes regarding organ donation both aids families in making
their decisions and increases the likelihood they will authorize organ
donation and be satisfied with their final decisions.61 By 2006, nineteen
states had first-person-authorization laws in place,62 and currently all
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted first-personauthorization laws.63 The transplant community largely supports this
concept, but doctors and OPOs do not always follow it when the next of
kin opposes donation.64
The disparity between general favor for organ donation and
consent rates has historically been and continues to be high.65 Ninetyfive percent of U.S. adults approve of organ donation, yet only fifty-four
percent are registered organ donors.66 First-person-authorization
legislation is designed to narrow this gap by ensuring that survivors
follow decedents’ wishes whenever they are documented.67 Eliminating
the need for familial consent increases the conversion rate—the rate at

57. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a).
58. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172–73.
59. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 7).
60. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172.
61. Heather M. Traino & Laura A. Siminoff, Attitudes and Acceptance of First Person
Authorization: A National Comparison of Donor and Nondonor Families, 74 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE
CARE SURGERY 294, 299 (2012).
62. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 7).
63. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173.
64. Id. at 175.
65. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3).
66. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Organ Donation Statistics, ORGANDONOR.GOV,
https://organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html
(last
visited
Jan.
13,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/4C2C-662E] [hereinafter Organ Donation Statistics].
67. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3).
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which eligible donors68 are “converted” into actual donors—because
families, at least theoretically, cannot override the wishes of decedents
who have indicated a preference to donate.69 Thus, introducing firstperson authorization increases the number of actual deceased organ
donors because there is a higher likelihood that the donor’s wish to
donate, as opposed to the donor’s family’s wishes against donation, is
respected.70
2. Good Faith Defense
Under both the original UAGA and the 2006 Revised Act, doctors
and hospital personnel may assert an affirmative defense of good
faith.71 The good faith defense removes criminal and civil liability when
doctors and other hospital personnel violate the UAGA but do so while
attempting in good faith to act in accordance with the UAGA.72 “The
good-faith immunity provision . . . does not require strict compliance
with the [UAGA]’s procedures for obtaining and conveying donative
consent; rather, it immunizes good-faith efforts to comply with its
mandatory procedures.”73 The widely accepted definition and objective
standard adopted is “an honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.”74
Courts have traditionally interpreted the defense’s coverage
extremely broadly, effectively protecting the medical community.75 For
example, courts found the good faith defense dispositive when a
hospital worker mistakenly harvested bones from a decedent whose
family had specifically refused consent76 and when an eye bank
harvested corneas from a deceased patient when doctors misread the
consent form and mistakenly thought the family had authorized eye

68. Eligible donors are those patients who have been declared medically brain dead and do
not have any organs with major diseases or infections. See 42 C.F.R. § 486.302 (2018).
69. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5).
70. Id.
71. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
amended 2009); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4(a) (1968) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1987).
72. Beyer, supra note 20 (manuscript at 7).
73. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 91 (2013).
74. See Sattler v. Nw. Tissue Ctr., 42 P.3d 440, 443 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928,
930 (Sup. Ct. 1987)) (tracking the creation of the definition by a New York court and subsequent
adoption by a federal district court and state courts in Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Alabama).
75. Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal
Considerations in Rejecting a Deceased’s Anatomical Gift Because There Is No Consent by the
Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REV. 323, 334–35 (2002).
76. Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
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donation.77 The public policy rationale behind the defense is to
encourage medical personnel to move forward with donation and
transplantation operations without fear of subsequent liability.78
Courts consider this rationale when determining whether defendants
may successfully invoke the defense.79 Transplant professionals have
only asserted the defense in actions brought by a donor’s family, as
there are no plaintiffs to sue on behalf of patients on the waiting list to
enforce compliance with first-person authorization.80 Thus, transplant
professionals have never had the need to assert the defense in a suit
brought by a decedent’s estate for failing to retrieve and donate organs
when she registered as a donor but the OPO allowed her family to
override her decision.
3. A Failed State-Driven Presumed-Consent Model
More than two-thirds of states previously experimented with
presumed-consent statutes, beginning in the late 1960s. These statutes
allowed for the retrieval of corneas and other eye tissues, pituitary
glands, and occasionally organs from deceased individuals in coroners’
or medical examiners’ custody.81 The rationale behind presumed
consent was that donating an eye tissue or, in rare circumstances, an
organ was no more invasive than a full autopsy, and therefore no
additional rights were infringed.82 Coroners and medical examiners
could only proceed with the retrieval if they were unaware of any
objections by the individuals or family members.83 As discussed
previously, the 1987 UAGA reinforced presumed-consent statutes by
recommending provisions for the donation of any organ or tissue from
cadavers in coroners’ and medical examiners’ custody when certain

77. Lyon v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 531, 536 (D. Minn. 1994).
78. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 336 (citing Williams v. Hofmann, 223 N.W.2d 844, 848–49
(Wis. 1974)).
79. See Sattler, 42 P.3d at 443 (“Affording the good faith defense to procurement
organizations effectuates the Legislature’s intent. Without the protection from liability provided
by the good faith defense, procurement organizations would likely hesitate to seek needed
donations.”); Williams, 223 N.W.2d at 848–49 (stating that “limitation on liability contained in
[section 7(c) of the UAGA of 1968] . . . is justified by the legitimate public purpose of encouraging
doctors to participate in the removal of organs following death, and therefore increasing their
supply”).
80. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 45–50, 147 n.20 (concluding that violations
of first-person authorization have gone unpunished because there is no plaintiff to enforce
compliance).
81. David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise and Fall in the United
States, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 299 (2009).
82. Id. at 299–300.
83. Id. at 300.
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prerequisites were met.84 After implementation, numerous state courts
found no violation of individual rights when individual plaintiffs
challenged the statutes.85
Two federal appellate court decisions, however, triggered the
movement to repeal presumed-consent legislation.86 In Brotherton v.
Cleveland,87 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “recognized
a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right for family
members” when the coroner took the corneas of the plaintiff’s spouse
after hospital personnel had specifically documented her objection in
the medical record.88 The coroner had a policy “not to obtain a next of
kin’s consent or to inspect the medical records or hospital documents
before removing corneas.”89 The Sixth Circuit never decided what level
of process was due to the plaintiff; only that “some process was due to
her before the corneas could be taken.”90
The Ninth Circuit recognized in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran91
that “family members may claim property rights in the body of a
deceased person” and some level of process is due to the family before
removing a decedent’s corneas.92 In Newman, the coroner—who made
approximately $250,000 per year from selling corneas to a for-profit
tissue bank—made every effort to avoid speaking with the family to
ensure he would not learn about any objections.93 Soon after, a trend
toward abandoning presumed consent emerged, and the 2006 Revised
Act essentially eliminated the 1987 provision encouraging it.94 All but

84. Id.; supra note 46 and accompanying text. The 2006 Revised Act similarly allows “any
other person having the authority to dispose of the decedent’s body” (which is often a coroner or
medical examiner) to make an anatomical gift after a reasonable search for family members and
no knowledge of refusal or objection. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9(a)(10) & cmt. (2006)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009). But the commentary states that “in that case it is most
unlikely that the decedent’s organs could be donated as they are not likely to be medically suitable
for transplantation or therapy given the amount of time that likely will pass before it can be
determined that no one else will claim the body.” Id. § 9 cmt. Of course, states could have adopted
the UAGA without including coroners or medical examiners as persons authorized to dispose of
bodies.
85. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 300.
86. Id. at 305–08.
87. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
88. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 306.
89. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478.
90. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 306.
91. 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
92. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 307.
93. Id. at 306.
94. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 cmt. (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
2009); see supra note 84.
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a few states repealed their presumed-consent laws, and those who
retained them mainly did so for cornea procurement only.95
C. Federal Regulation
Federal law prescribes standards for the procurement,
allocation, and transplantation of organs; it governs everything that
happens to the decedent and donee once the decedent’s donor status is
confirmed. In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act (“NOTA”)
created the Division of Organ Transplantation to oversee the OPTN and
Scientific Registry and to assert federal regulation over OPOs and
UNOS by exercising its rulemaking authority.96 The OPTN organizes a
national listing of transplant candidates, and the Scientific Registry
tracks records of organ donees. OPOs and UNOS predate NOTA, having
developed as hospitals and regions gradually cooperated and shared
organs. It was necessary for OPOs to produce a uniform list of waiting
patients through UNOS to allocate organs as they became available,
because the market of donors and donees expanded and hospitals
within a given region needed to share information fluidly with each
other and their designated OPO.97 Scholars debate how Congress
envisioned the execution of a federal system of transplant regulation
under NOTA.98 The public policy underlying NOTA, however, has never
been seriously questioned or evaluated; it is merely a de facto adoption
of the policy that justified the system as it existed in 1984.99 The federal

95. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-2-14-19 (2018) (allowing coroners and medical examiners to
remove corneas for transplant when they have attempted to contact individuals authorized to
make or refuse such a donation and do not know of any objection to the removal and donation of
the decedent’s corneas); WIS. STAT. § 157.06 (2018) (allowing coroners and medical examiners to
retrieve organs when there is no evidence of either making or refusing an anatomical gift and
every reasonable effort has been made to locate individuals who would be authorized to make or
refuse an anatomical gift on behalf of the decedent); see also Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 307–
08.
96. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 11.
97. Id.
98. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that Congress passed NOTA in
response to a Virginia physician attempting to alleviate the organ shortage by brokering livingdonor kidneys); James F. Blumstein, Government’s Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 22 (1989) (arguing NOTA had “distinct elements of a market-perfecting
orientation . . . compatible with a pluralistic, decentralized, voluntary system” and the resulting
network was much more centralized and uniform than intended by drafters); Frank A. Sloan et
al., Is There a Rationale for Regionalizing Organ Transplantation Services?, 14 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 115, 128–34 (1989) (arguing that Congress sought to establish a national procurement
and distribution system but was unsuccessful because allocation remains in the hands of local and
regional networks).
99. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 8.
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Act solidified the system of altruistic donation100 and established the
OPTN and Scientific Registry.101
UNOS oversees the national registry of potential donors and the
waiting list of potential donees.102 In 1969, the South-Eastern Organ
Procurement Foundation (“SEOPF”), an independent nonprofit
organization serving eight transplant centers in four states and the
District of Columbia, developed under federal contract a computer
system to create an organ-procurement and sharing network.103 Many
transplant centers outside of SEOPF’s region sought to use the
computer system, and in 1977, it was officially named the United
Network for Organ Sharing and became the national computer system
for registering transplant candidates and sharing organs across the
country.104 Before NOTA’s passage in 1984, some regional sharing
occurred outside of states and OPOs that matched using UNOS, but
NOTA required that all transplant candidates be listed on UNOS and
only permitted organ sharing through the OPTN.105
In response to a widening gap between donor-eligible deaths and
successful donations, HHS adopted two significant recommendations in
its 1998 final rule: (1) routine referral and (2) required request.106
Routine referral requires hospital personnel to refer all deaths that
occur in the hospital to its OPO.107 Required request obliges hospital
personnel to discuss the possibility of organ donation with surviving
family members, giving every family the opportunity to donate their
family member’s organs.108 Despite this federal mandate, a study
analyzing data on organ-donation consent rates between 2008 and 2011
100. By codifying the contemporary system of altruistic donation, Congress prevented the
possible formation of any market system for organ donation. See id. at 51–54 (arguing for the
creation of a market system in the United States).
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Howard et al., supra note 11, at 11.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 42 C.F.R. §§ 486.324, .342 (2018); Identification of Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye
Donors, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,856, 33,869–70 (June 22, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 482). The
1987 UAGA, an update of the original 1968 model statute, included another requirement, called
routine inquiry. Routine inquiry requires hospital personnel to ask patients upon admittance if
they would consider being organ donors, so the donative intention of every patient who enters the
hospital is known. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009). But only
twenty-four states adopted the 1987 UAGA. Crowe & Cohen, supra note 36. HHS did not include
the routine-inquiry requirement in any regulation, but 42 C.F.R. § 486.324(b)(12) gives OPO
boards the authority to recommend policies to assist “hospitals in establishing and implementing
protocols for making routine inquiries about organ donations by potential donors.” The 2006
Revised Act also does not include this requirement, but it is unclear why.
107. Identification of Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye Donors, 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,870.
108. 42 C.F.R. § 486.342(a).
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found that in three percent of cases (1,080 deaths), eligible donors’
families were not asked to donate the decedent’s organs.109 Even when
physicians did discuss organ donation with families, they refused to
consent in forty-six to fifty percent of cases.110 In theory, routine referral
and required request should have a significant impact on the number
of donors, but in practice, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure
hospitals are following protocol.
II. UNENFORCED RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Gift law governs organ donations and creates a binding contract
between the donor and the respective OPO: the donor intends to have
her organs donated for transplantation (or other specified purposes)
upon her death, and the OPO will follow her wishes if medically
possible.111 All three elements of an executed gift are present: donative
intent, transfer or delivery, and acceptance.112 When an OPO concedes
to family objections and refuses to procure the decedent’s organs, that
legally binding promise is compromised, which violates both the 2006
Revised Act’s first-person-authorization provision and common law gift
law.113 This Part first presents the two areas of law currently governing
organ transplantation and then explains why hospitals and OPOs
continue to degrade first-person authorization without repercussion. It
concludes by positing that OPOs, as private, nonprofit actors, must be
held to the same standards as other nonprofits and risk losing taxexempt status if they breach 501(c)(3) duties to confer a public benefit.
A. Property Rights in Dead Bodies
The “no property” rule—a common law principle that no one has
a property right of ownership in a dead body—developed in English

109. See David S. Goldberg et al., Deceased Organ Donation Consent Rates Among Racial and
Ethnic Minorities and Older Potential Donors, 41 CRITICAL CARE MED. 496, 499 (2013).
110. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 309–10.
111. See Alexandra K. Glazier, Organ Donation and the Principles of Gift Law, 13 CLINICAL J.
AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1283, 1283 (2018) (“The UAGA establishes gift law as the central legal
principle in the United States opt-in system of organ donation.”); Daniel G. Jardine, Comment,
Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals’ and Organ Procurement Organizations’ Rejection of Valid
Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1655, 1657, 1671.
112. See Alexandra K. Glazier, The Principles of Gift Law and the Regulation of Organ
Donation, 24 TRANSPLANT INT’L 368, 368 (2011).
113. See Adherence to First Person Consent, NATCO (Nov. 2009), http://www.natco1.org/
Advocacy/files/First Person Consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDQ3-EW4K] [hereinafter NATCO
Policy Statement].
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common law.114 English common law, however, did recognize the right
of a decedent’s executors to custody and possession of the body until its
proper burial.115 Using English common law as a foundation, U.S.
courts similarly adopted the no property rule and protected the family’s
right of proper burial as a “quasi-property” right.116 This quasi-property
right gives next of kin a cause of action against anyone who tortiously
interferes with the burial and proper preservation of remains.117 But
once buried, the next of kin loses any constitutionally protected
property interest in the body.118 The phrase “quasi-property” is
misleading, as it creates no real property rights and only has vague
legal protections for both controlling the body for burial and preventing
organ removal.119
Some states have modified common law principles to recognize
stronger property rights in dead bodies. For example, Texas has
modified the common law to prioritize a decedent’s properly expressed
wishes regarding burial instructions over the wishes of living
individuals who have the right to control the disposition of the
decedent’s remains.120 But there is no statutory penalty for failing to
comply with the decedent’s wishes.121 Other “states recognize a
legitimate claim of entitlement by the next of kin to possession of the
remains . . . for burial or other lawful disposition” and permit next of
kin to bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions arising from an “alleged
deprivation of procedural due process with regard to such remains.”122
To some extent, the UAGA itself morphed common law property
principles concerning dead bodies. Although the Act does not grant to
any person a property right in the donor’s dead body, it recognizes the
OPO’s superior right to the body over the “limited privilege of the next

114. P.D.G. Skegg, Medical Uses of Corpses and the ‘No Property’ Rule, 32 MED. SCI. & L. 311,
311–12, 314 (1992). It is unclear where this principle originated, with scholars speculating that
the rule developed either as a result of dead bodies normally being subject to the control of the
ecclesiastical courts or because judges believed that treating corpses as property would devalue
them. Id. at 314.
115. Id. at 312.
116. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (2018).
117. Id.
118. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 5 (2013).
119. Bucklin, supra note 75, at 327 (“It seems reasonably obvious that the word ‘quasiproperty’ [was] something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the
personal feelings of the survivors [were] being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one
but a lawyer.” (alterations in original) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984))).
120. Beyer, supra note 20 (manuscript at 8).
121. Id. (manuscript at 13).
122. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 4. Section 1983 actions are civil suits for the deprivation
of rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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of kin to later get the body for burial.”123 The law is currently too vague
to determine the legal implications of not following this prescribed order
of rights. For example, if a person violates the order, it is unclear what
entity, if any, is entitled to sue. If the OPO gives up its superior interest,
it is disregarding the decisions of both the donor and the potential
donee,124 but neither individual is in a position to sue to enforce her
rights. The decedent has no legal representative available to advocate
for her rights, and the potential donee has no idea that her potentially
lifesaving organ would be available but for the OPO’s refusal to procure
it in violation of state law.
B. Gift Law
Gift law governs all anatomical donations in the United States125
and derives from property law.126 “A ‘gift’ is a voluntary transfer of
property by one person to another without any consideration or
compensation therefor.”127 A “perfected,” or executed, gift has the same
legal status as an executed contract if “founded upon the consent of the
parties.”128 That is, the gift becomes legally enforceable. Three elements
must be satisfied to constitute a legally enforceable gift: (1) donative
intent, (2) transfer or delivery, and (3) acceptance.129
Donative intent requires that the donee make the gift
voluntarily and form “an affirmative objective to donate.”130 This legal
requirement is satisfied through the “document of gift,” which is
documentation that indicates the individual would like to consent to
donate.131 Under the current U.S. “opt-in” or “explicit-consent” donorregistration and donation system, an individual may document her
consent to donate by signing a donor card—indicating such intent when
she renews her license or registers online through her local OPO’s or
state’s internet-based donor registry.132

123. Bucklin, supra note 75, at 333.
124. Id. at 342.
125. Legal Aspects of a Registered Donor: What You Need to Know, ALLIANCE (2017),
https://organdonationalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CSuite-Snapshot-Fall-2017FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRQ3-LYK6].
126. Glazier, supra note 112, at 368.
127. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 1 (2010).
128. Id. § 2.
129. Glazier, supra note 112, at 368.
130. Id. at 369.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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Transfer or delivery is the second step in perfecting a gift.133
Delivery in the context of gift law may include manual delivery
(physically transferring the property),134 constructive delivery
(transferring a physical object that will give access to the property),135
or symbolic delivery (transferring a symbol of the property to eventually
be transferred, such as a written instrument).136 In the context of organ
donation, symbolic delivery is satisfied when the OPO receives the
electronic transmission or physical form indicating the donor’s intent to
donate organs upon death.137
Acceptance by the OPO is the final requirement to complete the
legally enforceable gift, and the OPO accepts the gift by allowing the
donor on the registry. The OPO, not the eventual donee, must accept
the gift because under the UAGA, the OPO is the legal donee.138
Therefore, the gifting of organs is completed before death and is legally
enforceable upon the donor’s death, as long as she does not change her
mind before being declared medically brain dead.139 OPOs that refuse
to procure organs from a donor until the family consents are in the legal
position of rejecting the gift and requesting the same gift again from the
next of kin.140
Symbolic delivery is the most appropriate delivery paradigm in
the context of organ donations. One scholar has suggested the transfer
element is satisfied through manual delivery when doctors transplant
the organ into the body of the donee.141 This theory is incorrect; if
transferring the organ into the donee’s body were the only way to satisfy
the transfer requirement, the anatomical gift would not be legally

133. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 2, at 762 n.5 (“[D]elivery is the adrenaline that makes it a contract
executed.”).
134. Id. § 19 (actual delivery is given when it is shown that the “owner parted with dominion
and control over the gift”).
135. Id. § 21 (constructive delivery is given when, “in place of actual manual transfer, the
donor delivers to the donee the means of obtaining possession and control of the subject matter or,
in some other manner, relinquishes to the donee power and dominion over it”).
136. Id. (symbolic delivery is given when, “instead of the thing itself, some other object is
handed over in its name and stead”).
137. Symbolic delivery is permitted when manual or constructive delivery is impossible. Id.
138. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c)(3) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
2009) (“If the part is an organ and the gift is for the purpose of transplantation or therapy, the gift
passes to the appropriate organ procurement organization as custodian of the organ.”).
139. Id. § 6(a) (describing the process of amending and revoking an anatomical gift as done
before a donor’s death).
140. Bucklin, supra note 75, at 337–38.
141. Glazier, supra note 112, at 370 (identifying the transfer element of a gift as one that
“involves the recovery of the donated organ and the delivery of the organ to the recipient”).
Alexandra Glazier is the president and CEO of New England Donor Services, an affiliation
between two OPOs. See Alexandra Glazier, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexandraglazier-914677 (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/42M3-JWVQ].
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binding until after such a transfer. Thus, an OPO (and eventual
transplant donee) would not have legal title to the organ until it had
already been transplanted. This framework risks not fulfilling the
donor’s wishes if the family is allowed to intervene and disrupt the
donor’s intent. A manual delivery theory is incorrect also because it
designates acceptance by the donee or donee’s surgeon as fulfilling the
legal requirement of acceptance,142 whereas the UAGA states explicitly
that the OPO is the legal donee of the organ.143
C. The Current Lack of Enforcement of First-Person Authorization
OPOs have employed diverse tactics to implement first-personauthorization statutes—such as communicating to families their desire
to honor the patient’s wishes rather than asking for consent144—but a
significant number of registered donors’ wishes are still not followed.
Not executing a donor’s gift is a violation of first-person-authorization
statutes in every state; as of 2013, however, twenty percent of OPOs
still had not procured an organ when the next of kin objected, and
thirty-five percent reported they had yet to “proceed with organ
procurement from a registered organ donor whose family objected to
donation.”145 Fifteen percent of OPOs had not been presented with the
dilemma and may still refuse to procure organs when confronted with
family objections.146
The acts of OPOs that refuse to honor first-person authorization
are not only unethical147 but in express violation of section 8(a) of the
2006 Revised Act. The ULC added section 8(a) in response to OPOs not

142. Glazier, supra note 112, at 370 (highlighting that the donee or the donee’s surgeon may
accept the gift).
143. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c)(3) (designating organ procurement
organizations as custodians of the gifted organ); see also Bucklin, supra note 75, at 329 (declaring
the OPO “the ‘donee’ of the gift from the donor”).
144. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173.
145. Id. at 172–73; see also Casey Leins, Should the Government Decide if You’re an Organ
Donor?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 12, 2016, 1:37 PM), www.usnews.com/news/articles/201602-12/presumed-consent-and-americas-organ-donor-shortage
[https://perma.cc/5FHL-KVSW]
(“[H]ealth care workers still don’t want to take organs without the family’s consent and don’t follow
[first-person-authorization laws] in practice, says Arthur Caplan, director of the Division of
Medical Ethics at the New York University Langone Medical Center.”).
146. Fifty-one OPOs reported that a registered donor’s family objects in less than ten percent
of cases, six OPOs reported that a registered donor’s family objects in eleven to twenty-five percent
of cases, and one OPO did not respond. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172–74; see also Traino &
Siminoff, supra note 61, at 296 (noting that while “some OPOs will uphold decedents’ wishes in
the face of family dissent, others choose not to procure out of habit and/or to prevent negative
publicity”).
147. See Chon et al., supra note 52, at 175.
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in compliance with the 1987 UAGA,148 and the drafters specifically
intended to clarify and address this problem.149 The ULC included in its
notes to the 2006 Revised Act that seeking affirmation of a gift from the
donor’s family could result in not only unnecessary delays in recovering
the organs but also the reversal of the donor’s donation decision:
Section 8 intentionally disempowers families from making or revoking anatomical gifts in
contravention of a donor’s wishes. Thus, under the strengthened language of this [Act], if
a donor had made an anatomical gift, there is no reason to seek consent from the donor’s
family as they have no right to give it legally.150

Involving families in the organ transplantation process is
permissible,151 but allowing them to override the decedent’s wishes is
not.
NATCO, a trade group for transplant professionals, has
announced its support for first-person authorization and the 2006
Revised Act.152 But it mischaracterized the legal issue: NATCO
recognized that “not accepting the donation from a clinically suitable
donor is a violation” of the UAGA, but transplant professionals’ “[f]ears
about litigation should be mitigated by” the good faith defense when
they proceed with organ and tissue donations in the face of family
objections.153 This statement correctly notes that transplant
professionals should feel confident that they will be insulated from
litigation when they act in good faith, but it fails to address OPOs’ legal
obligations to procure donated organs. No OPO, transplant center, or
doctor has been penalized to date for refusing to honor first-person
authorization, which, in turn, creates a perverse incentive for OPOs and
others involved in the donation process to keep discarding the express
wishes of the decedent in exchange for the grieving family’s approval.154
OPOs that do not procure organs over family objections cite
potential lawsuits and negative publicity as the primary motivating

148. The 1987 UAGA included one provision that mandated OPOs follow first-person
authorization. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT.
149. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note.
150. Id.
151. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 175.
152. NATCO Policy Statement, supra note 113.
153. Id.
154. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 147 n.20:
After death, the rights of the intended recipient (if one exists) are to dominate the claims
of all others under this law. Nonetheless, attending physicians routinely require
permission from the patient’s family before removing the organs. . . . Such violations
have gone unpunished to date, apparently because there is no identifiable plaintiff to
enforce compliance.
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factors in neglecting the donor’s wishes.155 Transplant professionals’
fear of potential lawsuits is based on a misinterpretation of the law, as
not following the decedent’s wishes violates the 2006 Revised Act. Fear
of negative publicity, however, may not be misplaced. Only once has an
OPO filed suit to retrieve organs from a registered donor when the
family vehemently objected,156 and the move came with significant
backlash. Although the OPO won and procured the registered donor’s
organs, the local media focused on the family’s grief and disbelief that
doctors could take its son’s organs over its wishes.157 Given that OPOs
are responsible for registering and educating the public in their regions
and maintaining close working relationships with transplant centers,158
it is unsurprising some will trade UAGA compliance for positive
relationships with communities and hospitals. Thus, OPOs need
stronger incentives to comply with first-person authorization while
preserving positive relationships with health-care providers.
D. 501(c)(3) Status and Obligations
OPOs incorporate as nonprofit organizations in the state in
which they are headquartered. A nonprofit, or 501(c)(3), organization
enjoys tax-exempt status159 but must be organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, among others inapplicable in the
organ-donation context.160 State nonprofit law governs nonprofits,
which the state attorney general enforces. Typically, the state attorney
general alone has the power to bring lawsuits to enforce compliance

155. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 176; NATCO Policy Statement, supra note 113. Some organdonation advocates argue that
[s]ince most Americans approve of organ donation, it is difficult to imagine a
newspaper’s editor siding with a next of kin who wants to prevent his deceased
relative’s decision to make an organ donation. It is more likely that the newspaper
would paint the next of kin as a person trying to frustrate a decedent’s dying wish and
call the OPO a hero for implementing the moral act of the decedent.
Bucklin, supra note 75, at 339–40 (footnote omitted).
156. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173; Allison Manning, Family Loses Fight to Keep Son’s
Organs from Donation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/
content/stories/local/2013/07/11/Judge-ordered-family-to-let-brain-dead-son-donate-organs.html
[https://perma.cc/EMJ3-EVLE] (describing the first time that Lifeline of Ohio, an organ
procurement organization, went to court over a donation).
157. See Court: Man’s Organs Donated Despite Mom’s Plea, TIMESREPORTER.COM (July 12,
2013,
12:01
PM),
http://www.timesreporter.com/article/20130712/NEWS/307129861
[https://perma.cc/AJ6K-WKAY]; Manning, supra note 156.
158. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13; Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14.
159. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
160. Id.
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with 501(c)(3) because she “is the representative of the public in
compelling the trustees to perform their duties properly.”161
Section 501(c)(3) also requires that no part of the net earnings of
the organization benefit any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the organization’s activities be devoted to attempts
to influence legislation, and no part of the organization’s activities
include participating in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate
for public office.162 The U.S. Supreme Court has imposed another
requirement for organizations to obtain and maintain tax-exempt
status: they must serve a valid public purpose and confer a public
benefit.163 A single substantial nonexempt purpose or payment will
“destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of [the]
truly [exempt] purposes” of the organization.164 In Bob Jones University
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the IRS properly denied
tax-exempt status to a nonprofit private school because its racially
discriminatory admissions standards were “so at odds with the common
community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might
otherwise be conferred.”165
Federal law requires OPOs to operate as nonprofit organizations
that advance a scientific purpose.166 Specifically, they must identify
potential organ donors within their service areas; conduct systematic
efforts to acquire all usable organs from potential donors; arrange for
the acquisition and preservation of donated organs and set quality
standards for such a process; allocate donated organs equitably among
transplant patients; provide or arrange for the transportation of
donated organs to transplant centers; assist hospitals in establishing
and implementing protocols for routine request; and fulfill other duties
set forth by federal regulation.167 OPOs confer a public benefit by
managing organ-procurement and allocation systems to facilitate organ
donation within their geographic areas and by conducting public
outreach to increase the number of registered donors and thus the
number of lifesaving organ transplants performed each year.
When an OPO does not comply with first-person-authorization
legislation, it undermines the public benefit it purports to confer—and
thus puts its nonprofit status in jeopardy. If the IRS were to revoke
161.
2018).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND TAXATION § 14:6 (2d ed.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); PHELAN, supra note 161, § 12:1.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589–91 (1983).
Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
461 U.S. at 592.
42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Id. § 273(b)(3).
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nonprofit status, the OPO would face several consequences: losing
eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions, losing exempt status
from federal income tax, becoming obligated to pay corporate income
tax on annual revenue, and potentially being subjected to back taxes.168
More importantly, the population the OPO serves would have to be
absorbed by other OPOs. Even if the added population and donor
numbers were proportional after absorption, other OPO
responsibilities—such as educating the public in order to increase donor
rates—would be spread more thinly, and at least in the interim, the
same number of personnel would become responsible for coordinating
more transplants.169 For example, the Iowa Donor Network, the OPO
that serves the state of Iowa, is responsible for more than three million
people.170 If it were to shut down, more than three million people would
have to be absorbed by other OPOs, who would have to take on the
responsibility for education efforts and coordination of transplants
among this additional population. Also, the dissolution of an OPO could
send a negative message to the public about the stability and
importance of the organ-donation system—if the OPO in the area does
not operate according to law, how can we trust other OPOs to follow the
law?
III. AMENDING THE UAGA ONCE MORE
States spearheaded the movement toward improved
coordination and regulation of the organ-donation process with the
1968 UAGA; they should endeavor to regain their roles as the true
regulators and enforcers in an effort to drive up the organ supply.
Although the federal government largely regulates OPOs, they are
incorporated under state law and should be held accountable to serve
the taxpayers of the states that grant them 501(c)(3) status. State
policies implemented during the past two decades to increase organ

168. See
Revocation
of
Tax
Exemption,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/revocation-of-tax-exemption (last visited Jan.
13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/49N2-D75F]; Revoked? Reinstated? Learn More, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/automatic-revocation-of-exemption (last updated Dec.
13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/35JZ-HVQB].
169. See Howard et al., supra note 11, at 14 (describing the federal regulation imposed upon
OPO operations that requires the use of “systematic efforts, including professional education, to
acquire all usable organs from potential donors,” while noting that the decrease in the number of
OPOs has been met with an increase in transplant centers).
170. SCI. REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, IOWA DONOR NETWORK 7 (2018),
https://www.srtr.org/document/pdf?fileName=%5C102018_release%5CpdfOSR%5CIAOPOP1XX2
01805P.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6LT-KYDB].
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donation have had little to no effect.171 The first-person-authorization
component of the 2006 Revised Act has made no significant impact on
donation rates,172 and states must enforce their laws and closely
monitor the organizations that are responsible for the transplant
process—which involves life-and-death matters—within their jurisdictions.
Even if state attorneys general strictly enforced first-person
authorization, they would not substantially close the gap between the
numbers of organs available and patients on the waiting list.173 Federal
regulation currently requires OPOs to meet specific performance
standards,174 but simply raising such standards will not supply OPOs
with adequate resources to increase the organ-donor pool. Thus, to
significantly resolve the organ shortage, states should adopt a twofold
solution by amending the UAGA to (1) switch the donation system to
“presumed consent” but allow individuals to opt out of being an organ
donor, either through online registries or while renewing their driver’s
licenses, and (2) create a monitoring and enforcement mechanism for
the new system within state health departments and offices of
attorneys general. These amendments would essentially create a state
statutory scheme that requires OPOs to procure organs of a decedent
unless the individual expressed her wishes not to donate during her
lifetime and excludes the next of kin from the process entirely. This type

171. See Paula Chatterjee et al., The Effect of State Policies on Organ Donation and
Transplantation in the United States, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1323, 1327 (2015) (finding that
the passage of revenue policies, “contributing to an additional 6.5 deceased donors and 8
transplants from deceased donors per year for an average state,” had only a small effect); Satel &
Cronin, supra note 7, at 1329 (examining six state-level policies from 1988 to 2010 and concluding
that only a dedicated revenue stream for donor recruitment and promotion activities caused a
“modest rise in the rate of transplants”).
172. Chatterjee et al., supra note 171, at 1326–27 (noting that “[f]irst-person consent laws,”
among other efforts, “had no robust, significant association with either donation rates or number
of transplants”).
173. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that between thirteen thousand
and twenty-nine thousand deaths occurred under circumstances that would allow for organ
donation); Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172 (reporting that family objections only occur between
ten and twenty-five percent of the time); Donors Exceeded 10,000, supra note 5 (stating that there
were 10,281 deceased organ donors in 2017).
174. 42 C.F.R. § 486.318 (2018). Only nine to fourteen percent of OPOs 2009–11, however,
were meeting the review criteria of the Scientific Registry, which bases its standards on observed
yield and expected yield. Therefore, between eighty-six and ninety-one percent of OPOs were
failing in all three areas of criteria: observed yield is at least ten percent lower than expected yield,
observed yield per one hundred donors is at least ten less than expected yield per one hundred
donors, and the observed yield is statistically significantly different than expected yield. David A.
Zaun et al., Monitoring Performance of Organ Procurement Organization in the United States:
Observed and Expected Donor Yield, SCI. REGISTRY TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS (2011),
https://www.srtr.org/media/1103/atc2012_zaun.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6CF-N575].
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of system, termed a “hard opt-out” system, increased donation rates by
twenty-five percent in Austria and Singapore.175
A. A Presumed-Consent Model
Enforcing first-person authorization in the current opt-in system
will not be enough to combat the organ-donation shortage. In the last
thirty years, the waiting list for an organ transplant has grown nearly
eight-fold, from 15,029 people in 1988 to 113,737 as of February 2019,176
while the number of donors has increased less than three-fold, from
5,909 in 1988 to 16,473 in 2017.177 To address this disparity, individual
states should adopt a presumed-consent model similar to those
currently used in over twenty countries.178 This model could be termed,
as one scholar suggested, “default to donation” rather than “presumed
consent” to achieve greater public acceptance and not be viewed as the
taking of individual rights.179
1. Framing the Issue in Favor of Donation: Not So Radical After All?
Switching to an “opt-out,” or presumed-consent model of
donation, is not as radical or detrimental as some commentators
suggest. In a study analyzing organ-recovery rates from twenty-two
countries that do not require explicit consent, researchers found that
these countries had approximately twenty-five to thirty percent higher
recovery rates for deceased organ donors than countries with opt-in
systems.180 There has been remarkably high and long-standing support
175. Organ Donation: Does an Opt-Out System Increase Transplants?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-41199918 [https://perma.cc/33A9-58RN]; see also What Is
HOTA All About?, SING. GOV’T (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.gov.sg/factually/content/what-is-hotaall-about [https://perma.cc/7GNX-Z4Y9] (explaining Singapore’s organ-donation system).
176. Transplant Trends, supra note 6; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ethics of
Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/ethics-of-deceased-organ-donor-recovery
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3GVV-3R8X] [hereinafter Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor
Recovery].
177. Total Number of Organ Donors in the United States from 1988 to 2018, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/398384/total-number-of-us-organ-donors/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2019) [https://perma.cc/25MN-E2TG].
178. See Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176.
179. See Leins, supra note 145.
180. Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176; see also Shai Davidai et al.,
The Meaning of Default Options for Potential Organ Donors, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
15201, 15201 (2012) (noting the difference in average organ-donation rates between opt-in
countries (less than fifteen-percent participation) and opt-out countries (more than ninety-percent
participation) and attributing it to “the difference in relative effort and initiative required for
participation”); Lee Shepherd et al., An International Comparison of Deceased and Living Organ
Donation/Transplant Rates in Opt-In and Opt-Out Systems: A Panel Study, 12 BMC MED. 131
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for organ donation by the general public, but the rate of organ-donor
registration has remained low.181 In one survey, HHS found that about
half of Americans explicitly stated they would support an opt-out
system.182 Instead of drivers being asked to check a box to become an
organ donor, they would be asked to check a box if they would prefer
not to become an organ donor. This model returns higher rates of
donation, social psychologists have theorized, because when faced with
difficult decisions, people tend to avoid making a choice and instead
prefer to follow the default option.183
Another study found that the type of system (opt in or opt out)
causes large differences in the meaning that individuals attach to
participation.184 Participants asked to think about a country with an
opt-in policy judged organ donation to be on par with highly meaningful
and significant prosocial behaviors, such as giving away half of one’s
wealth to charity upon death, and almost equivalent to going on a
hunger strike to advocate for a cause.185 In contrast, participants asked
to think about a country with an opt-out policy judged organ donation
to be on par with prosocial behaviors that were relatively lower in
meaningfulness and significance, such as letting others go ahead in line
and volunteering to help the poor.186 The study ultimately concluded
not only that procrastination and laziness are factors contributing to
individuals’ failures to register in opt-in countries but also that
(2014) (analyzing data from forty-eight countries, including opt-in countries, and finding similar
results and that higher rates are a direct cause of the opt-out systems).
181. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 172. As of 2016, ninety-five percent of Americans support
organ donation, and sixty percent who have not signed up to be an organ donor would be willing
to do so. See Leins, supra note 145. This is an increase from the eighty-five percent of Americans
who supported organ donation in 1993 and the seventy-five percent who supported the practice in
1985. Identification of Potential Organ, Tissue, and Eye Donors, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,856, 33,857 (June
22, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 482) (citing a 1993 Gallup poll); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT
ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
(2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009) (citing a 1985 Gallup poll).
182. Leins, supra note 145. Contra Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176
(“A deceased organ recovery model that does not require explicit consent would not gain sufficient
support in the US to merit a policy change.”).
183. See Dan Ariely, Are We in Control of Our Own Decisions?, TED (Dec. 2008),
https://www.ted.com/talks/dan_ariely_asks_are_we_in_control_of_our_own_decisions
[https://perma.cc/E3JZ-KHS7] (asserting that the reason countries with default organ-donation
systems have higher rates of organ donation is that individuals tend to choose the default option
when confronted with complicated decisions). This study is supported by data finding that
mandatory-consent systems return much lower registration rates than expected. A mandatoryconsent system forces individuals to choose, “Yes, I want to be a donor,” or, “No, not at this time.”
A popular theory explains that this behavior is due to people feeling uncomfortable thinking about
the ends of their lives and, when forced to make a choice, picking whichever choice does not force
them to consider their demise. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 13–14).
184. Davidai et al., supra note 180, at 15203.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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“[p]articipation or nonparticipation . . . is heavily influenced by the
meaning that people individually and collectively attach to the opt-in or
opt-out choice in question.”187
2. An Answer to the Question of Donative Intent
Families often claim a lack of knowledge of the decedent’s
donation preferences as a significant reason for refusing donation. Some
families report that they interpret an undesignated donation status on
a driver’s license or lack of registration as a clear indication that the
decedent had previously declined donation rather than an indication
that the decedent was undecided.188 Operating in a presumed-consent
system would put families on notice that unless the decedent made the
express choice to opt out, she intended to donate her organs. There
would be no question regarding whether the decedent would have been
okay with donating; if the idea of donation ran counter to her religious
beliefs or morals or otherwise concerned her, she would have opted out.
The presumed-consent model would also more fully honor
decedents’ quasi-property rights than the current model. Gift law189
currently infers donative intent from the affirmative decision to register
to be an organ donor. Under a presumed-consent model, the donative
intent is suddenly murkier: Did the decedent affirmatively intend to
donate her organs, or did she forget to opt out? If she merely forgot to
opt out, are her quasi-property rights in her own body now violated?190
This potential violation of rights is the same issue that occurs in the
current system when OPOs refuse to follow first-person authorization;
individual preferences on how a body is used posthumously are
discarded in place of the family’s or doctor’s judgment of what the
individual should have wanted. Often, in situations when a family
objects and overrides a decedent’s preference for organ donation, it is
not thinking about what the decedent wanted but what it wants in its
immense time of grief.191
Ninety-five percent of adults in the United States currently
support organ donation,192 and sixty percent of those who have not
registered are willing to do so.193 While fifty-four percent of the adult
187. Id.
188. Levin, supra note 9 (manuscript at 13).
189. See supra Section II.B.
190. See Ethics of Deceased Organ Donor Recovery, supra note 176 (explaining a major
criticism of the presumed-consent model is that if the decedent forgot to opt out, her individual
rights would be violated).
191. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 311–12.
192. Organ Donation Statistics, supra note 66.
193. Leins, supra note 145.
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population is already registered, approximately another twenty-seven
percent of the population would also prefer to donate.194 This means
that 81.6 percent of the adult population in the United States likely
wants to become organ donors.195 Ethicists have argued that this is not
nearly high enough to justify a presumed-consent model—this would
indeed not be high enough if every person, regardless of preferences,
had to donate and there was no ability to opt out.196 But under the
presumed-consent model this Note proposes, the ability to opt out is
kept intact. Thus, by presuming consent, more decedents would have
their quasi-property rights honored than in an opt-in model.
Moreover, OPOs and transplant centers could institute the
routine inquiry requirement proposed in the 1987 UAGA197—asking
every patient during admittance to the hospital whether she would or
would not like to be an organ donor—which would serve as another
filter to document objections long before either the hospital or patient
must make the donation decision.
3. The United States’ Previous Brush with Presumed Consent: Why
This Time Is Different
A new presumed-consent system would address the problems
that triggered the Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases that led to the
dissolution of the state-driven opt-out system in the United States,
discussed in Section I.B.3. Under the new system, a consolidated, online
registry would hold objections—the same type currently used, but with
the names of individuals who opt out of donating their organs. There
would be no ability for hospital or OPO personnel to blind themselves
to a patient’s objection, as in Brotherton and Newman. Instead, to
retrieve and transplant organs, the system would have to be checked,
and whether the patient had registered her preference not to donate
would have to appear on the death certificate. With technological
advances, a phone call or fax has become a click of a button, making for
a much more streamlined and easy-to-access objections database.
Besides, procurements would occur in hospitals where patients die,
providing more oversight than remote, disconnected locations run by
194. Forty-six percent of the adult population is not registered to donate, but sixty percent of
that population would like to register. See Organ Donation Statistics, supra note 66 (stating fiftyfour percent of the U.S. adult population is registered to donate). Thus, the percentage of the
population that is unregistered but wishes to donate is 27.6 percent (46% × 60% = 27.6%).
195. This estimate comes from the sum of the registered donor population (fifty-four percent)
and the population of unregistered donors who would like to donate (27.6 percent).
196. Chon et al., supra note 52, at 176.
197. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987), amended by REVISED
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009); see supra note 106.
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individual doctors. Most importantly, no financial incentive to procure
more organs would exist, because all organs would be directly gifted to
an OPO and used for transplantation. Organs could only be sold if
doctors successfully harvested them in the hospital without detection,
smuggled them out of the hospital, and auctioned them on the black
market—the same extreme (but unlikely) threat that exists in the
current opt-in system.
Most significantly, the presumed-consent system this Note
proposes would create a hard opt-out policy198 rather than the soft optout policy199 previously implemented. Empowering state attorneys
general to sue OPOs that do not follow first-person authorization for
breaching 501(c)(3) status creates a hard opt-out policy and is necessary
because “a key reason why organs are not obtained after a person’s
death is the unwillingness of family members to give consent”200 when
donative intentions are unknown. This failure to follow first-person
authorization was a central flaw in the implementation of the brief, illregulated presumed-consent system used by states in the 1960s.201
B. A Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanism
Transitioning from an opt-in to opt-out presumption in favor of
donation will not eradicate the issue of OPOs’ failure to follow firstperson authorization. Individual autonomy to choose organ donation is
at the centerpiece of state organ-donation legislation yet is not
consistently followed—OPOs have neither the motivation nor tools to
enforce a decedent’s wishes, and a presumed-consent policy will not
necessarily change this. The first-person-authorization problem
presents itself differently in a presumed-consent system: an individual
chooses not to opt out and fails to communicate her intentions,202 and
the family objects to the procurement of her organs when she dies.
Section 12(c) of the 2006 Revised Act allows for administrative
sanctions for failing to abide by the statute, but there is no record of any
OPO official receiving administrative sanctions for failing to follow
first-person authorization. OPOs impose the administrative sanctions
themselves, and states do not monitor or oversee OPOs’ compliance
with the UAGA on a case-by-case basis.203 The only evidence that OPOs
198. Consent for Organ Donation, IR. DEP’T HEALTH, http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/consentoptions.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9MPA-AVAY].
199. Id.
200. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 309.
201. Id. at 309–10.
202. Id. at 311.
203. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 12(c) (2006) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2009).
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do not follow first-person authorization is anecdotal204 and by
anonymous self-reporting.205 States need to create a monitoring and
enforcement mechanism to remedy this oversight. This can be
accomplished efficiently by amending the UAGA to require OPO bylaws
to include a provision mandating that the OPO always follow firstperson authorization. Any violation of such a provision would constitute
a breach of the OPO’s purpose to confer a public benefit,206 thus
providing grounds for revoking its 501(c)(3) status under state law. The
new provision would delegate the task of monitoring OPOs’ compliance
to state health departments and empower state attorneys general to sue
OPOs in breach of their 501(c)(3) statuses, the current enforcement
mechanism for nearly all breaches of nonprofit status.207
1. State Attorneys General Enforce OPOs’ 501(c)(3) Statuses
Currently, there appears to be no standard set of bylaws for
OPOs mandated by federal regulation or state law. OPOs must meet
performance standards set by federal regulation208 and abide by
applicable state laws as incorporated nonprofits, which includes firstperson authorization statutes. But OPOs may currently ignore firstperson authorization without repercussion. The UAGA should be
amended to include a provision requiring a mandatory bylaw for all
OPOs, such as the following: “The OPO shall abide by all provisions of
the [name of the state statute adopting the UAGA], including firstperson authorization, which forbids OPO personnel to allow next of kin
to override the decedent’s decision to donate.” Another provision should
address the effect of the earlier provision, such as this example: “An
OPO’s failure to strictly follow all bylaws of the OPO will be considered
a breach of the nonprofit’s duty to confer a public benefit.” The second
provision is necessary to give state attorneys general sufficient grounds
to argue that even one breach of first-person authorization provides a
sufficient basis to sue. Most litigation regarding breaches of purpose
and revocation of 501(c)(3) status is based on a substantial deviation
from an organization’s broader stated purpose,209 so courts may decide
one breach is not sufficient to consider revocation of 501(c)(3) status. To
avoid this problem, this proposed provision makes clear that one breach
is sufficient for OPOs to lose their nonprofit statuses or face other
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See Leins, supra note 145.
Chon et al., supra note 52, at 173.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
PHELAN, supra note 161, § 14:6.
42 C.F.R. § 486.318 (2018).
PHELAN, supra note 161, § 12:1.
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sanctions. Also, this interpretation of a breach for purposes of
revocation of nonprofit status would be limited narrowly to the organdonation and OPO context and thus is inapplicable to other types of
nonprofits. These amendments to the UAGA would therefore not
disrupt the operations and expectations of other nonprofits.
Under these amendments, an OPO could not invoke the good
faith defense in response to such a suit, because a conscious decision
not to follow the law cannot be considered an attempt to act in good
faith. The good faith defense is designed for situations in which
transplant professionals mistakenly remove an organ without
consent210 but were acting in good faith “in accordance” with the law.
Under the amended statute, refusing to procure organs over family
objections would not be acting “in accordance” with the law, and the
good faith defense would not apply. This is arguably already true under
the 2006 Revised Act,211 but because no plaintiff exists to represent the
rights of potential donees, no situation has ever arisen in which a
plaintiff could rebut the defense in this manner.212 Additionally, the
good faith defense only immunizes medical professionals from suits by
donors’ next of kin, not suits brought by another party on behalf of
potential donees—the attorney general under the amended statute.213
A breach of 501(c)(3) status is the best theory of liability under
which to sue OPOs, as the law tasks the state attorney general with
representing all citizens, and nonprofits receive benefits from
taxpayers. A noncompliant OPO is detrimental not just to patients on
the waiting list but also to the general public. The existence of a wellfunctioning and successful OPO is a public health concern that affects
not only those in need of a transplant but their families, employers, and
insurance companies, as well as taxpayers who may contribute to their
treatment until an organ is available.214
Multiple sources have advocated for class actions on behalf of
individuals on the transplant list, which would sue OPOs under
negligence, tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, and

210. See Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 668–69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding good faith defense against liability when bone was harvested mistakenly).
211. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 338 (arguing that UAGA does not intend for OPOs to
decline valid gifts due to family objections).
212. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 14, at 45–50, 147 n.20.
213. Jardine, supra note 111, at 1664.
214. For example, “the net welfare gain for society over the lifetime of a kidney recipient” is
$1,132,000 per patient. P.J. Held et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of
Kidney Donors, 16 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 877, 880 (2016) (analyzing the net costs to society
when patients receive a kidney transplant rather than stay on dialysis).
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violation of civil rights theories of liability.215 These strategies are
impractical and perhaps impossible. First, the public does not and
should not have adequate access to information that would support
these theories of liability.216 Second, although the fifty-eight OPOs have
exclusive jurisdiction and responsibility for their territories, not all
patients in need of an organ will receive one from their region’s OPO.217
UNOS allocates organs based on many factors, and organs can be
procured within one OPO’s jurisdiction and transported to another’s.218
In assessing which plaintiffs are eligible to join a suit against an
OPO in violation of first-person authorization, would it be only those
patients within the OPO’s jurisdiction? Patients in the region who could
have received an organ from the OPO? All patients on the national
waiting list, exposing a single OPO to liability so large as to cover every
patient that died while waiting for a transplant? Additionally, an OPO’s
failure to follow state law does not technically wrong patients still
waiting for a transplant—the estates of those who died while waiting
for a transplant are entitled to a remedy. Under the new presumedconsent model, it is imperative that a party representing the rights of
all citizens has standing to sue. A doctor or OPO that procures organs
over a decedent’s documented objection (registration on the opt-out list)
should also be held accountable by the state attorney general for
violating first-person authorization.
2. State Health Departments Monitor OPOs
The UAGA should also be amended to task the state health
department with monitoring the OPO that serves its population and
require that the state health department refer all potential violations
to the state attorney general for investigation. State governments
usually task their respective health departments with monitoring
health-care services provided by the private sector and improving the
adequacy and availability of health-care resources within the state.219
The adequacy and availability of organs for transplants within the state
215. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 339, 342–48 (addressing possible causes of action); Jardine,
supra note 111, at 1667–80 (analyzing a potential negligence action).
216. See infra Section III.B.2.
217. A recipient’s distance from the donor hospital is a consideration for all types of organ
transplants, but some organs (e.g., the pancreas and kidneys) can be preserved outside the human
body longer than others, and thus those organs can travel longer distances. Other factors are also
considered when UNOS determines allocation. How Organs Are Matched, UNOS, https://unos.org/
transplantation/matching-organs/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L2EC-UZEA].
218. Id.
219. Eileen Salinsky, Governmental Public Health: An Overview of State and Local Public
Health Agencies, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. 13–14 (Aug. 18, 2010), https://www.nhpf.org/library/
background-papers/BP77_GovPublicHealth_08-18-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LHZ-GC7V].
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is a critical public health concern, and state health agencies have the
experience and expertise to monitor and improve OPO performance.
Donor registries are managed at the state level,220 and states already
collect death certificates from patients who are declared dead at
hospitals.221 State health departments can compare these two lists with
data from OPOs and hospitals on the organs that were procured for
transplants and determine whether OPOs followed first-person
authorization by procuring organs from each person not on the opt-out
list (and those with organs unsuitable for transplantation). Such a caseby-case comparison requires access to both the donor registry and death
certificates, and therefore it would be impossible for a class of plaintiffs
representing patients on the waiting list to prove an OPO refused
anatomical gifts.
State health departments have the expertise to assist OPOs
when families object to organ procurement and can assist in training
OPOs and hospital personnel regarding their legal responsibilities.222
In difficult cases, a state health-department official can speak with the
family and explain the importance of the donation and the legal
ramifications for the OPO if it refuses to comply with the law. This
counseling would also ease relations with the OPO and the hospital in
the wake of enacting an amended UAGA; decedents’ families would
view the state health department’s lawyers as distinct from the hospital
and their loved one’s care. It is important to separate the appearance of
conflicting interests,223 and separating the interests of attorneys (the
hospital’s versus the health department’s) could further reinforce the
family’s faith that the decedent is being declared dead not to procure
her organs but because she is medically deceased.224
CONCLUSION
Increasingly sophisticated organ-transplantation technology
brings with it the ability to save thousands of lives in the United States

220. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Organ Donation FAQs, ORGANDONOR.GOV,
https://www.organdonor.gov/about/facts-terms/donation-faqs.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/W8U3-99ZF].
221. See Documenting Death—The Certificate, PBS (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/post-mortem/things-to-know/death-certificates.html [https://perma.cc/7J8BGMCW] (stating that most states utilize the U.S. Standard Death Certificate).
222. See Salinsky, supra note 219, at 11–15 (describing the array of regulatory and
administrative functions performed by state health agencies).
223. See Donation Process, supra note 23 (noting that hospital staff is completely separate
from transplant team).
224. Orentlicher, supra note 81, at 296–97 (noting a popular fear that doctors will declare
patients dead just to harvest their organs).
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each year, but absent significant changes in legislation, the public will
never benefit from this improvement. States initially led the movement
to regulate the organ-donation process and should now reemerge as the
leaders in organ-donation policy reform. Current law gives states the
ability to both monitor and enforce the organizations responsible for the
success of organ donation within their jurisdictions, and a policy switch
to presumed consent would further ensure that hospitals and OPOs
follow donative intent. States should adopt a twofold solution by
amending the UAGA: first, changing the default presumption of
donative intent to presumed consent, and second, requiring state health
departments to monitor their respective OPOs and refer breaches of
nonprofit obligations to state attorneys general for enforcement. Now is
the time for states to give waiting patients another chance at life before
the game is over.
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